A stash that cost freedom: defence strategies that work in 2026

Just five years ago, drug dealing in Ukraine looked like a meeting on a street corner. Today it is a Telegram channel, a bot administrator, a cryptocurrency wallet, and a “stash” hidden in a pipe under a bench. The scheme has changed, and with it the defence tactics have changed as well.

Case one: when “dealing” turns out to be “possession”

A man was detained in a car — the police found a substance on the front passenger seat. The investigation immediately classified this as dealing: a substantial quantity, packaged in portions, everything “by the textbook”. But the defence asked a simple question: how do we know that the defendant even knew the substance was in the car?

It turned out the car had recently been sold and not yet re-registered, other people had been in the vehicle, and the prosecution had no direct evidence that the defendant was aware of the substance. The court agreed: intent to deal was not proven. The charge was reclassified to possession, and instead of a custodial sentence the client received a fine (given the specific circumstances of the case).

This is not a rare situation. Article 307 (dealing) and Article 309 (possession) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine differ not by the substance itself, but by the proven intent. And it is intent that is the weakest link in the prosecution’s case in the vast majority of proceedings.

Case two: when the “buyer” creates the crime

The second story is about a line that law‑enforcement officers sometimes cross. An undercover agent spent months calling, arranging meetings, and persuading the person to “help get” the substance. Someone who had never been involved in anything of the kind eventually agreed — and found himself under investigation.

The defence was built around one question: would the defendant have committed this crime if he had not been pushed into it? The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Ramanauskas v. Lithuania, set out a clear criterion: if law‑enforcement officers do not merely observe a crime but actually initiate and incite it themselves, this is provocation, not investigation. The Supreme Court of Ukraine consistently follows this approach: if the prosecution cannot prove that a person was ready to commit the crime without the agent’s intervention, all evidence obtained through such a “test purchase” is deemed inadmissible.

The trial court found that provocation had occurred, and the court of appeal agreed — the charges were dismissed not at the stage of assessing the merits of the evidence, but at the stage of assessing its admissibility.

2026: new channels, same principles

In the summer of this year, the police uncovered another inter‑regional channel for distributing psychotropic substances that operated exclusively via Telegram: buyers would message a bot, receive the coordinates of a stash, and pay in cryptocurrency. Similar stories now occur regularly. At the same time, law‑enforcement agencies are developing their own proactive tools: chatbots such as “DrugHunters” or “StopDrugs”, where anyone can anonymously send the geolocation of a suspicious place.

For the defence this means a new category of evidence: screenshots of chats, geo‑tags, IP addresses, data from crypto‑wallets. And a new category of questions. Who administered the channel? Has it been proven that it was the defendant who was writing from the specific account? Was the procedure for seizing and examining devices properly followed? A digital trail is not automatically evidence against a particular person, and challenging its attribution and admissibility often becomes the key battleground in such cases.

What really determines the outcome of the case

Based on recent years’ practice, several lines of argument can be identified that consistently work in favour of the defence:

• Challenging intent to deal, where the quantity or circumstances do not unequivocally prove an intention to sell rather than to use.
• Verifying the lawfulness of covert investigative actions; controlled purchases, special operations, and crime‑scene simulations have clear procedural limits, and breaches of those limits “destroy” the evidence.
• Checking for provocation, especially where the initiative in communication came from the “buyer” or agent rather than from the defendant.
• Voluntary surrender of the substance, which is a separate ground for exemption from liability; courts carefully distinguish between a person truly surrendering the substance of their own free will and merely confessing after being stopped.
• Attribution of digital evidence, which often becomes decisive in cases involving Telegram channels.

Key takeaway

The model of drug‑related offences has shifted — from the street to the messenger app. But the essence of the defence remains the same: not to deny facts for the sake of denial, but to test whether the prosecution has proven every element of the offence as required by law. Often it is precisely where the investigation feels most confident that the weak point of the case is hidden.

If you or your relatives find yourselves in a similar situation, it is crucial to contact a lawyer as soon as possible, even before the first questioning.

Author: Nazar Al-Mzirawi, attorney at law, Law Firm “WINNER”.

A properly constructed defence strategy from the very first hours of the case has a substantial impact on its outcome.