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2025: A Pivotal Year for Small and Medium Businesses in Ukraine The year 2025 became a milestone for small and medium-sized businesses in Ukraine: moratoriums on inspections were lifted, financial penalties became stricter, and new risk criteria for entrepreneurs were introduced. Individual entrepreneurs (FOPs) returned to the focus of oversight by the State Tax Service (STS) and other regulatory bodies. Knowledge of the main aspects of tax inspections has become essential to avoid financial losses, stress, and business stoppages. Types of FOP Inspections There are several main types of inspections applied to FOPs in 2025: Desk (cameral) audit— conducted automatically and without the entrepreneur’s participation, based on submitted declarations and reports. It checks the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of tax payments. Actual inspection— an unexpected on-site check, which can occur at the place of business if there is suspicion of violations such as unregistered employees, calculation errors, or absence/incorrect use of cash registers (RRO/PRRO). Documentary inspection— scheduled or unscheduled, includes checking all primary, financial, and accounting documents of the entrepreneur. Legislative Changes in 2025 Moratorium Lift Until December 1, 2024, FOPs of groups 1–2 were under a moratorium on documentary inspections, but from this date and from January 1, 2025, for all other categories, the moratorium was lifted. This increased the number of inspections by 35% in 2025 compared to the previous year. Legislative Innovations From March 1, 2025, new rules for the use of RRO/PRRO, the mandatory presence of POS terminals, and expanded responsibility for violations of labor and tax legislation came into force. Stricter financial sanctions for violations of settlement operations return as of August 1, 2025. Who Inspects FOPs and for What? The main body is the STS, but other agencies—such as the State Labour Service, State Consumer Service, State Environmental Inspectorate, and the State Emergency Service (for certain activities)—may also conduct their own inspections. The most common grounds for inspections include: Breach of turnover limits Operations without registration or with incorrect KVEDs Absence or improper use of RRO/PRRO Unregistered employees Systematic failure to submit reports Customer complaints or other external signals How Are Inspection Schedules Formed? The annual inspection schedule by the STS is published on its official website by December 25. The list includes entrepreneurs with increased tax risks based on several criteria: significant growth/drop in income, frequent changes in KVEDs, suspicious transactions with risky counterparts, many cash operations, tax debt, client complaints. You can check whether your FOP is on the schedule via your tax number. List of Documents for Inspection During an inspection, FOPs may be required to present: FOP registration documents Single tax or VAT certificates, if available Income ledger (or registers for the general system) Primary documents for the purchase of goods/materials, invoices, contracts Bank statements Employee documents: labor contracts, records of payment of social contributions and salaries For simplified system users — cash receipts, Z-reports, description of cash register software The absence of documents or inconsistencies may be grounds for fines. New Fines and Sanctions in 2025 For Cash Discipline and RRO Absence/incorrect use of RRO/PRRO: first case — 100% of the sale amount, second and subsequent — 150% Lack of ability to accept card payments (POS terminal): fine 1,700–17,000UAH, plus an additional 8,500UAH for refusing card servicing Providing services without conducting transactions through RRO: fine of 100% of the value of the goods or services For Labor Violations Unregistered employee: 80,000–240,000UAH per each Registration of employees with violations: 8,500–34,000UAH Operating without FOP registration: 17,000–85,000UAH For Failure to Submit or Errors in Reporting Ignoring a tax authority request: 8,000UAH or one minimum wage Late payment of the Unified Tax for groups 1–2: 50% of the tax rate Inspection Specifics During Martial Law In 2025, scheduled inspections are not conducted for FOPs registered in temporarily occupied or combat territories. Meanwhile, the STS actively conducts desk, actual, and unscheduled inspections in relatively “peaceful” regions. The rule remains: the lower the financial risk and the more transparent your activities, the less likely you are to be inspected. Grounds and Features of Unscheduled Inspections Unscheduled inspections are carried out in cases of: Detection of violations during cameral control Complaints or requests from citizens or business partners Signs of fictitious activity or tax evasion During liquidation or reorganization of an FOP What Inspectors Pay Attention to Completeness and correctness of income, expense, and reporting records Timely payment of taxes, dues, and social contributions Legality of employment of personnel Use of RRO/PRRO, proper execution of settlement transactions Availability and preservation of primary documents Compliance of activities with registered KVEDs Observance of income limits by group Common FOP Mistakes Operating without required cash registers Exceeding the income limit for their group or operating with unconfirmed KVEDs Unregistered labor relations or paying salaries in cash Missing primary documents, invoices, or bank statements Ignoring requests from regulatory authorities Delays/failure to submit reports How to Avoid Risks and Problems During Inspection Regularly check your inclusion in the inspection schedule Strictly follow accounting requirements, submit reports, and pay taxes on time Always have and keep all primary documents and receipts for at least the last three years If you have employees, formalize their employment officially Use RRO/PRRO and POS terminals if required by law Respond promptly to tax authority requests, providing a full set of documents Consult with qualified accountants and lawyers in case of doubt Conclusion 2025 was marked by significant changes in the state control system over FOP activities. Knowing your rights and obligations, detailed record keeping, and timely response to tax authority demands are the keys to business stability and protection. Failure to comply leads directly to painful financial losses and even suspension of business. Comply with the law, develop your literacy in accounting and taxation issues, and remain a successful entrepreneur even under the watchful eye of regulatory bodies. Author: Yulia Popadyn, criminal law and procedure attorney at Winner Law Firm     https://youtu.be/rEd6me-Ume4?si=9WaDMFSJCJ0uGY9J

In recent years, the issue of the actions of the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine (BES) toward business owners and managers has gained particular significance. Amid heightened public demand for combating economic crime and ensuring fair entrepreneurial activity, the BES is positioned by the state as an institution with a new philosophy — an analytical approach, focused on prevention rather than repressive punitive practices. However, in practice, the platform for coexistence between the state and business remains vulnerable to old schemes and methods of coercion. Mechanisms of BES Influence on Business Criminal ProsecutionThe BES has been granted exclusive powers to investigate various economic crimes, including: tax evasion, non-payment of taxes, fees, and mandatory charges (Art. 212 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), illegal use of trademarks and service marks (Art. 229 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), financial fraud and manipulations, smuggling, especially of excisable goods. The investigation process includes: entering information in the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations (URPI), searches at enterprises, seizure of documents, servers, and equipment, questioning of owners and management, arrests of company assets and bank accounts. BES detectives actively use covert investigative (search) actions — from phone tapping to accessing organizational electronic databases. Disciplinary and Administrative PenaltiesIn addition to criminal liability, the BES initiates administrative and disciplinary procedures: drawing up reports of administrative offenses (for example, under Art. 185-13 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, regarding non-fulfillment of lawful BES employee requirements), imposition of fines, destruction of illegal goods by court decision (as in the case of tobacco products). Systematic Pressure through Control and InspectionsThe BES is authorized to initiate and carry out inspections for compliance with tax and financial legislation by businesses. In fact, any owner or director can find themselves under suspicion. Business entities come to the attention of the BES both during regular operations and based on statements from “anonymous sources” or competitors. Case Examples and Real Consequences for Business Notable BES Interventions Tax evasion cases involving tens of millions of hryvnias: a large enterprise owned by a well-known businessman was exposed in tax evasion schemes; some companies were indirectly owned through partner structures. Atypical measures: courts ordered preventive measures for directors — including house arrest or setting bail in the millions. Seizure of property and equipment: for most participants in economic investigations this results in almost a complete shutdown of business operations and paralysis of activities. Statistics and Effectiveness of PenaltiesDespite the loud rhetoric, the real percentage of cases resulting in strict punishment is low. According to judicial register reviews: of all cases under Art. 212 of the Criminal Code, only 4 resulted in guilty verdicts; none of these verdicts involved actual imprisonment — most were suspended sentences or releases due to statutes of limitations. Reputational Impact and Current IssuesCreated as an alternative to the tax police — infamous for its pressure — the BES avoids old patterns only in declarations. In practice, the following persist: reliance on forceful tactics and pressure on business, use of ongoing criminal cases to create a “background pressure” (currently over 1.2 million such cases, growing by about 300,000 per year), embedding “influence risk” in business models — entrepreneurs often secretly pay corruption rents or bribes to close fabricated cases. Political Component and State ControlThere is a lack of trust in the transparency of BES leadership appointments, conflicts over director selection, and political expediency outweigh professionalism.Control over the BES is seen as a strategic tool for influencing big business; refusal to appoint an independent director was perceived by business associations as a threat to investment protection and a basis for government impunity.Entrepreneurs cite manifestations of political influence through economic security instruments as their main risks. Legal Risks for Owners and DirectorsCriminal case structures focus on personal responsibility of both owners and directors, as current practice dictates it is primarily they who give explanations, become suspects, and later defendants.The inclusion of even unsubstantiated information in the URPI serves as grounds for entirely lawful searches, equipment seizure, account blocking, and results in reputational damage and losses.Directors and shareholders are responsible for both “deliberate” economic crimes (e.g., fictitious bankruptcy or money laundering) and “formal” violations — even accounting errors or minor arithmetic discrepancies. Other Side: Is the BES Analytical Approach Working?Modern legal doctrine accepts professional business–law enforcement dialogue only when an analytical approach is applied. Yet: Experts and practitioners point to total distrust in leadership selection competitions for the BES, generating risks of the agency being used in “manual mode.” Criminal cases are often opened for minor violations or on anonymous complaints, nullifying the idea of risk-oriented analysis. Challenges, Prospects, and Recommendations Ukrainian businesses expect real changes in the state’s approach to economic security and transparency in BES leadership appointments; International financial partners directly link BES reform with Ukraine’s macro-financial support and commitments to the IMF and EU; Without an impartial structure that will replace business “terror” with analytics and digital transparency, domestic business will remain in a state of “legal pessimism.” ConclusionThe BES acts simultaneously as a punitive body and a tool of “operational influence” — with the potential to become the new tax police or a step toward a civilized economic order. In practice, despite legislative changes and loud declarations, business owners and directors remain vulnerable to sudden searches, open criminal cases, asset blocking, and reputational pressure. An effective balance between genuine crimes and contrived cases should form the nucleus of the as-yet-unrealized reform. Material prepared by: Yevhen Murchenko — Head of the Criminal Law and Procedure Practice, Law Association “Legal Company WINNER“ https://youtu.be/BAu08iebqrI?si=1lUQwezyv-w_owj4

The issue of tax evasion is one of the key matters in the sphere of the state’s financial security and the formation of a fair tax policy. A reduction in budget revenues due to deliberate avoidance of tax obligations creates significant risks both for the state itself and for the development of the socio-economic system as a whole. Since the topic of holding responsible for such acts concerns not only specialists but also a significant segment of business representatives and citizens, this article is devoted to a deep analysis of the question: who exactly is subject to liability for tax evasion. Concept of Tax Evasion Under Ukrainian legislation, tax evasion means intentional actions or inactions aimed at unlawfully reducing tax liabilities, concealing or understating them, as well as other forms of violating tax rules established by law. The precise boundaries of this crime are outlined in Article 212 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which defines which actions may lead to criminal liability and which to administrative or financial liability. Subjects of Liability: Who Can Be Held Responsible Officials of Legal EntitiesMost often, officials of enterprises, institutions, and organizations are held liable. These include heads, chief accountants, financial department employees, and, in some cases, members of the board. Liability applies to persons authorized to sign financial and economic documents as well as those who keep accounting records and submit reports. Individuals — EntrepreneursIndividual entrepreneurs, like legal entities, bear full responsibility for maintaining tax records and accurate budget calculations. A separate category includes individuals conducting entrepreneurial activities without establishing a legal entity but violating tax rules. Other PersonsAny individual obligated to pay taxes, fees, or other mandatory payments and who willfully evades them is also subject to liability. This may include ordinary citizens and persons without entrepreneur status who own income or property subject to taxation. Criteria for Liability Intentionality of Actions The key element of the crime is the presence of direct intent. That is, the person must consciously evade fulfilling their duty — for example, by not submitting a tax declaration, understating taxable objects, or concealing income. Accidental violations or reporting errors are generally not considered criminal acts. Amount of Unpaid Taxes Qualification of the act as a crime depends on the size of unpaid taxes: Significant amount— over 1,000 non-taxable income minimums. Large amount— over 3,000 non-taxable income minimums. Especially large amount— over 5,000 non-taxable income minimums. In 2024, one non-taxable minimum equals 17 UAH, and the threshold for criminal liability is approximately 4.5 million UAH in unpaid taxes. Smaller sums entail administrative and financial sanctions. Types and Limits of Liability Depending on the amount of unpaid funds and circumstances of the act, the following penalties apply: Finefrom 5,000 to 25,000 non-taxable minimums. Disqualificationfrom holding certain positions or engaging in certain activities for up to 3 years. Confiscation of property— in cases of especially large amounts or repeated crimes. Exemption from criminal liability is possible only if the tax debt along with penalties and fines is fully paid before the case is brought. Features of Proof and Judicial Practice Proving intent requires establishing not merely the fact of non-payment but the presence of direct intent to evade taxes. Key evidence often includes analysis of tax documentation, calculations, and correspondence of persons responsible for record-keeping. The amount of damage caused must be determined according to current regulations. Presence of organized group activity or repeated crime are aggravating circumstances that increase punishment. When Liability May Be Avoided Ukrainian law allows that a person who has paid the full amount of tax debt with penalties and fines before criminal proceedings may be exempted from liability. This provision encourages voluntary restoration of violated state interests before investigation or court procedures begin. Conclusions Liability for tax evasion in Ukraine is multi-level and aimed both at prevention and punishment of offenders. The main subjects subject to this liability are: officials of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, individual entrepreneurs, any other taxpayers whose actions are intentional. The ultimate criterion for liability is not merely the fact of non-payment but the presence of intent, confirmed by the volume of damage caused and conclusions of relevant expert evaluations. The fight against evasion is primarily a matter of financial security, tax fairness, and sustainable state development. Material prepared by: Yevhen Murchenko — Head of the Criminal Law and Procedure Practice, Law Association “Legal Company WINNER“ At the bottom of the video, the team of the Law Association “Legal Company WINNER” defends the client in court.     https://youtu.be/V6VIYjriyBw?si=6fklo_P6s-cbMLKd

Economic expertise is a specialized branch of forensic examination involving comprehensive analysis of financial and economic issues arising in the investigation and adjudication of criminal cases. In modern times, economic expertise is an indispensable tool for establishing factual truth in cases involving economic crimes such as fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement, money laundering, and others. The effectiveness of criminal proceedings largely depends on the proper organization and execution of economic expert assessments. Legal Framework and Regulatory Acts The conduct of economic expertise is governed by the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine “On Forensic Examinations,” and other legal instruments. The expertise is appointed by an investigator, prosecutor, or court and must be performed by qualified experts possessing relevant education and experience in economics, accounting, auditing, or finance. Procedural safeguards include access to case materials, the right of parties to request expertise, the right to examine expert conclusions and to appeal them within the legal framework. Subject and Objectives of Economic Expertise The subject of examination includes the financial and business activities of enterprises, financial documents, transactions, accounting reports, tax declarations, contracts, and any other circumstances of economic importance related to the criminal proceeding. Key objectives of economic expertise are: Determining facts and volumes of damage or illegally obtained income. Identifying sources and patterns of damage formation. Confirming or disproving fictitious transactions or shadow business activity. Establishing compliance of financial documents with legal norms and standards. Assessing the efficiency of asset or enterprise management where relevant. Procedure for Appointment and Conduct of Expertise The process begins with a petition or an official order by investigative authorities or the court. Experts must maintain objectivity and competence. They analyze relevant documentation, conduct audits, calculate losses, model financial flows, and apply economic methods. Findings are formalized in an expert report comprising an overview of examined materials, methodology, results, and conclusions with recommendations. Role and Importance for Parties For prosecution, economic expertise is evidence to prove the commission of an economic crime, quantify damages, and identify responsible parties. For defense, it is a means to detect calculation errors, procedural violations, or misinterpretations affecting case outcomes. Properly conducted expertise enhances evidential quality, reduces wrongful decisions, and facilitates a comprehensive and impartial trial. Challenges and Issues Common challenges include potential bias, methodological shortcomings, limited access to full information, and delays caused by resource constraints. Disputes over expert conclusions’ validity and relevance also occur. Mitigation strategies involve adopting modern standards, continuous expert training, and strengthening professional communities. Conclusion Economic expertise is a powerful instrument within criminal proceedings, enabling in-depth and professional analysis of complex financial matters. Its appropriate use promotes justice, protects legitimate interests, and strengthens the rule of law. The effectiveness of such expertise relies not only on expert qualification but also on strict adherence to procedural norms, transparency, and availability of information. Prepared by: Yevhen Murchenko — Head of Criminal Law and Procedure Practice at Law Firm “WINNER”. At the bottom of the video, the team of the Law Firm Association “WINNER”. is defending a client in court.         https://youtu.be/V6VIYjriyBw?si=O-K7JCQlORclpPjr

Starting from February 24, 2022, when a legal regime of martial law was introduced in Ukraine, the activities of all spheres of public and economic life have undergone significant transformations. This also affected the system of state control, particularly the inspection activities of the State Labour Service — the body responsible for overseeing compliance with labor legislation. The conditions of martial law necessitated a special approach to inspections that combines minimizing the pressure on business while simultaneously preserving the rights and guarantees of employees in a critical situation. Legislative foundations of inspections during martial law The main regulatory acts governing the activities of the State Labour Service under martial law are the Law of Ukraine No. 2136-IX dated 15.03.2022 “On the organization of labor relations during martial law,” the Law of Ukraine No. 877-V dated 05.04.2007 “On the principles of state supervision (control) in the sphere of economic activity,” and Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 303 dated 13.03.2022 “On the suspension of state supervision (control) measures during martial law.” In particular, the latter document established a moratorium on scheduled inspections of enterprises and individual entrepreneurs for the duration of martial law to reduce administrative burdens and promote stable business operations in extraordinary circumstances. At the same time, the prohibition of inspections is not absolute — the legislation clearly specifies exceptional cases granting grounds for unscheduled inspection measures. Categories of inspections and their conditions Scheduled inspections conducted according to the annual control plan are currently completely prohibited. The formation of such plans may continue, but they will not be implemented until martial law is lifted or a separate decision is made by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Unscheduled inspections may only be conducted if specific grounds defined by law exist. These grounds include complaints from employees or trade unions regarding labor rights violations, notifications from local self-government bodies or military administrations, as well as situations related to accidents, industrial injuries, or occupational diseases. Inspections may also be initiated by government mandate or court decision. Special attention is given to cases where there is a threat to the life or health of workers or environmental safety. Under these conditions, the State Labour Service has the right to immediately respond to specific risks that cannot be ignored even during martial law. Inspection procedure The State Labour Service conducts inspections according to a strictly defined algorithm. First, the relevant complaint is registered, or the basis for control is recorded. On this basis, an official order to conduct the inspection is issued. Then, the inspector carries out an examination or inspection visit, collects information, interviews employees, and checks documents. Based on the inspection results, an act is drawn up, on the basis of which, if violations are found, the employer may be issued an order requiring elimination of the violations or a protocol on administrative offense may be drawn up. The inspection also monitors compliance with such orders. The overall duration of an unscheduled inspection for enterprises and organizations does not exceed 10 working days, and for small businesses — 2 days, allowing control to be executed without excessive delays in operations. Scope of the State Labour Service during martial law The State Labour Service retains authority to control compliance with labor legislation — timeliness and completeness of wage payments, legality of labor relations, including detection of undeclared workers (“shadow employment”). Special attention is paid to occupational safety — ensuring safe conditions, investigating accidents, preventing emergencies and occupational diseases. Starting July 2025, legislation prohibiting mobbing (workplace bullying) will come into force in Ukraine — this area will also be under control. The inability to conduct scheduled inspections does not exempt employers from responsibility for compliance. Unlike pre-crisis times, inspection attention now focuses on actual threats and violations that can lead to serious consequences for workers and society. Inspection powers and employer rights Inspectors of the State Labour Service are authorized to request documents, conduct examinations, interview hired workers, and temporarily access administrative and production premises of enterprises. If violations are found, they may issue orders, draw up administrative protocols, and initiate administrative responsibility, including fines according to the Labor Code. Employers have the right to receive a copy of the inspection order, familiarize themselves with its grounds, invite representatives (including lawyers) to the inspection, provide explanations in oral or written form, and appeal any decisions or actions of the State Labour Service in court. Practice and challenges During the years of martial law, the number of unscheduled inspections has significantly increased, driven by the growth of complaints from employees and requests from military administrations. Inspections of enterprises in critical infrastructure and with heightened risks to life and health have been particularly active. Courts and the State Labour Service assess violations considering martial law conditions: serious violations posing threats to life are strictly punished, while formal deficiencies that are quickly rectified may not result in severe penalties, positively affecting business stability. Businesses are advised to develop a systematic approach to personnel management, internal audits, legal support, and timely response to identified risks. Successful adaptation is characterized by the ability to anticipate possible inspections, enhance transparency of labor relations, and maintain constructive dialogue with controlling authorities. Conclusions Martial law has changed approaches to labor law compliance control in Ukraine, leading to a moratorium on scheduled inspections and focusing attention on emergencies and real threats. Despite the easing of formal oversight, this regime requires increased responsibility, adaptability, and rigorous compliance with legal norms from employers. In such circumstances, the strategy for success is preventive work and professional legal support. Author: Managing Partner of the Law Firm “WINNER,” PhD in Law — Ihor Yasko   https://youtu.be/iloP1cPpo7M?si=Msrlz-cteHDt3qHE

Legalization (money laundering) of property obtained through crime remains a focus of current Ukrainian legal policy. Article 209 of the Criminal Code is a key instrument in countering this phenomenon — it embodies the state’s response to attempts to “cleanse” illegal proceeds and integrate them into the legal economy. However, the question of exactly who can be accused under this article generates much practical debate among lawyers, businesses, and the public. This material discusses: The range of potential defendants under Article 209 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine; The conditions and evidence required for prosecution; Features of the subjective aspect of the crime; Typical money laundering schemes and real prosecution examples; Risks for business and individuals; Judicial practice and problematic issues in applying this law. Essence of the crime: what is legalization (money laundering) under the Criminal Code of Ukraine The law defines legalization as actions connected to “acquiring, possessing, using, or disposing of property known or should have been known to be of criminal origin, including financial operations and actions aimed at concealing or disguising the origin of property or rights to it.” Simply put, this is any activity involving assets obtained through criminal means (e.g., theft, corruption, tax evasion) that are later used, resold, invested, or otherwise attempted to be integrated into the legal sector. Who can potentially be accused under Article 209 2.1. Main subject of the crime Any individual aged 16 or over and of sound mind may be prosecuted. Citizenship is irrelevant: Article 209 applies to citizens of Ukraine, foreigners, and stateless persons if the crime is connected to assets acquired or laundered in Ukraine or if such actions have consequences in Ukraine. 2.2. Circle of persons by involvement Direct organizers of the crime (those personally conducting acquisition, conversion, or other operations with “dirty” assets) Company officials, owners, and beneficiaries (if assets are laundered using corporate mechanisms) Intermediaries, nominal holders (“drops”) Formal owners of assets (such as relatives or proxies) Professional advisers, lawyers, accountants (if their active role is proven)Legal entities are not criminally liable, but proceedings against their officials often lead to asset freezes and business collapse. 2.3. Real precedents Heads of banks and financial institutions assisting clients in suspicious transactions Entrepreneurs purchasing property or vehicles with large cash payments from illicit sources Individuals receiving large “unknown” transfers and immediately spending or rerouting them Crypto exchange participants through whom illicit funds are laundered Public officials facilitating legal cover for assets via fake deals Subjective aspect: knowledge or “should have known” It is sufficient to prove a person knew or, based on the case’s circumstances, should have known of the criminal origin. Even absent direct intent to launder, ignoring clear risks is equated by law with intent. Objective aspect: which actions constitute legalization Acquisition of material or non-material assets without valid source explanations Use and disposal: sale, transfer, pledge, remittance, investment, privatization Concealment or disguise (dummy companies, fake loans, offshore transfers, asset reshaping) Proof of criminal origin: the role of court and verdict A court verdict or sufficient evidence of unlawful origin is required. Mere suspicion or media reports are not enough — a court decision on the predicate crime is necessary. Real case studies of Article 209 application Injecting cash from conversion centers into the official economy for real estate via fake loans/credits Purchasing luxury vehicles after multi-step transfers via shell companies Withdrawing cash via crypto platforms, then spending on legal investments Embezzlement of budget funds with subsequent property purchases under relatives’ names. Main risk groups SMEs dealing with cash, valuable goods, export-import, non-documented services Private individuals receiving large unexplained transfers, buying elite real estate Public officials, lawyers, financial intermediaries, consultants Contentious issues and defense mistakes Lack of documentary proof of source often leads to prosecution Fake contracts and “dummy” loans are seen as aiding legalization, regardless of motive Objectively suspicious actions (large cash loan repayments, third-party transfers) can trigger prosecution even without confirmed knowledge of illicit origin Judicial practice and specifics of proof Courts analyze all circumstances: presence of a predicate crime verdict, mismatched sums, anomalous transactions, absence of business rationale, etc. Conclusions and recommendations Any adult competent person may be held criminally liable under Article 209 if it is proven they knew or “should have known” the asset’s illicit origin. Extra caution is advised for entrepreneurs, high-risk asset owners, and those dealing with large cash flows or involved in financial/consulting schemes. Financial monitoring, record keeping, and deal transparency are key to legal protection and avoiding baseless prosecution. Formal risk indicators (large transactions, intermediaries, complex resale structures, lack of sources) can turn against the accused even without criminal intent. Professional advisers and officials may be liable even indirectly. Lawyer’s advice: “Do not ignore risks relating to your assets, comply with monitoring requirements, maintain full transaction transparency, and consult experts without fear. Article 209’s key feature is your awareness or duty to be aware of an asset’s origin!”Author: Ihor Yasko, Managing Partner, ‘Winner’ Law Firm, PhD   https://youtu.be/5kQ73atNbDg?si=Ie-4DDEh3wfJiLXV

In modern Ukraine, the declaration of income and assets by public officials has become a key tool in the fight against corruption, ensuring transparency, and public oversight of government activities. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) plays a crucial role in this process, being responsible not only for the organization and verification of filed declarations, but also for responding to cases of false declarations.Legal assessment and punishment for submitting false information in asset declarations have sparked significant public and political debate, and evolving legislation illustrates continual adaption of control mechanisms to new challenges. The Essence of Declaration and the Role of the NACP The declaration of income and assets is not just a formality — it is a cornerstone of integrity for those holding positions in the public sector. According to the law, all public servants, judges, members of parliament, representatives of local governments, as well as their family members, are required to annually submit declarations detailing their property, income, financial liabilities, and other relevant information. The NACP checks declarations based on a risk-oriented approach. A full audit is not done for every declaration; significant risks of inaccuracy or abnormal asset increases trigger a more thorough review. Types and Criteria of False Information The concept of “false information” in declarations is clearly defined: False information means figures or data in the declaration that differ from reality by an amount exceeding 100 subsistence minimums for able-bodied persons, or fail to identify a family member or declared asset. Inaccurate information refers to smaller discrepancies (up to 100 subsistence minimums), which may be corrected without severe penalties. The threshold amount is determined annually based on the subsistence minimum at the time the declaration is filed. Grounds and Types of Liability Ukrainian law provides for three main types of liability for submitting false information in declarations: Disciplinary Liability This applies if the false information has no monetary value or the discrepancy is minimal (less than 100 subsistence minimums). Disciplinary actions depend on job regulations and may include reprimands, warnings, or dismissal. Administrative Liability Applies if the sum of false information ranges from 100 to 500 subsistence minimums (under Article 172-6 of the Code of Administrative Offenses). The penalty is a fine of 1,000–2,500 non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens. Separate provisions exist for late submission without valid reasons: a fine of 50–100 non-taxable minimum incomes. Criminal Liability The strictest penalties apply if the discrepancy exceeds 500 subsistence minimums (Art. 366-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine): From 500 to 2,000 subsistence minimums: a fine of 3,000–4,000 non-taxable minimums, community service (150–240 hours), or up to two years of restriction of liberty, with an additional ban on holding certain positions for up to three years. Over 2,000 subsistence minimums: a fine of 4,000–5,000 non-taxable minimums, community service, restriction or imprisonment for up to two years, and a similar ban on positions. Criminal liability arises only if intent is proven. The legal definition requires “knowingly false information,” where the declarant deliberately submits false data. Procedures and Stages of Declaration Verification After submission, the verification process includes: Preliminary check — automatic verification of completeness and accuracy. Full check — an independent audit triggered by substantial risks or information from the public or law enforcement. Establishing a violation — the NACP draws up a substantiated conclusion about false data. Referral to law enforcement — if legal thresholds are exceeded, materials are sent for further investigation. Problems of Interpretation and Enforcement A main challenge in practice is proving intent when false information is submitted. Both administrative and criminal liability require established intent. Typical issues: Mistakes in declarations are not always due to corrupt intent; some are complex procedures or objective difficulties in gathering data. The law allows correcting a declaration within 30 days after submission, without liability, if the error is fixed before the NACP review has begun. It is important whether a family member or asset can still be identified; if so, it is considered inaccurate, not false, information. Anti-Corruption Register and Public Sensitivity Data about individuals held liable for submitting false declarations is incorporated into the Unified State Register of Corrupt Officials. This has serious consequences for careers, reputation, and future eligibility for public office. Public scrutiny in such cases often triggers further investigations and affects trust in the government. Constitutional Court Decision and Impact on Liability In 2020, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court issued a landmark decision annulling criminal liability for false declarations, leading to many cases being dismissed and threatening the anti-corruption reform. After domestic and international pressure, liability was partially restored by new legislation. International Experience and Ukrainian Specifics Ukraine is not unique in implementing electronic asset declaration systems and liability for knowingly false information. Countries in the EU, USA, Canada, and others have similar anti-corruption infrastructure. The Ukrainian model, though, is distinct in its threshold amounts, oversight bodies, and enforcement practices. Conclusions and Prospects The asset declaration and liability system is a vital part of anti-corruption reform in Ukraine but needs ongoing improvement. Procedures for registering and punishing false declarations are complex, making effective investigation and prosecution challenging. Mechanisms for correcting honest mistakes without liability humanize the system but should not become a loophole for concealing assets. The effectiveness of sanctions depends largely on consistent judicial and investigative practice. Unavoidable liability, due diligence in declaration, and effective NACP performance are crucial for fostering public trust in government and ensuring the integrity of authorities. Svitlana Krutorogova — attorney at the Law Firm “WINNER“. At the bottom of the video, the team of the Law Firm Association ” WINNER” is defending a client in court. https://youtu.be/V6VIYjriyBw?si=zHhNvMN0N0ah4wev

In July 2025, the Verkhovna Rada voted lightning-fast and the President promptly signed a law that, in essence, destroys the independence of NABU and SAPO, placing them entirely under the authority of the Prosecutor General. No discussions, no delays — a decision that immediately sparked a wave of outrage among the public, experts, and international partners. The consequences are unpredictable but certainly not positive. What is the essence of the changes? Draft Law №12414 fundamentally changes the criminal process: The Prosecutor General now has full access to NABU’s cases and can take or transfer them anywhere. The Prosecutor General may also change jurisdiction, issue written instructions to NABU detectives, and effectively decide who receives suspicion notices. SAPO is essentially removed from making key decisions, losing any influence over the process. Who voted and why? 263 deputies from various factions said “yes.” The main support came from “Servant of the People,” but others joined as well. The official motivation: “martial law, need for efficiency and centralization.” The unofficial reason is simple: control. Control over cases, suspicions, and risks that could emerge during elections or media scandals. What do experts say? Legal dimension: this is the dismantling of the independence of anti-corruption bodies. Any high-profile case can now be easily “moved” to a convenient office. Political dimension: the government loses the trust of the active part of society. Anti-corruption activists are preparing new resistance campaigns. International dimension: the EU and donors have already expressed concern. This is a direct threat to cooperation with the IMF, European Commission, and other key partners. Social reaction The feeling is déjà vu. New faces, old methods. Protests in cities, a burst of criticism on social media. People wonder: why break what somehow worked, especially at such a critical time? Most importantly, no one predicted the consequences Even the authors of the changes cannot explain what happens next. Options: Chaos in the system as cases simply don’t reach a verdict. Anti-corruption bodies become a mere formality. Ukraine’s international ratings collapse — along with investment and trust. Are these changes really “better” than before? Politicians are confident that “now everything is truly under control.” But history has shown many times that such confidence usually leads to disaster. Passing the law convinced that “we’re not like our predecessors,” they actually repeat their mistakes, only faster and harsher. Conclusion This law is another step toward centralizing power. But in a situation where social trust is almost the only thing holding the country together, playing with it is dangerous. Time will tell. The only question is — at what cost. Managing Partner of the Law Firm Association “WINNER Law Company“, PhD in Law – Ihor Yasko https://youtu.be/k2-1dq7hxcY?si=wBCY8ZLlWm2qHrT-

Document, seal, stamp, and form forgery is one of the most widespread criminal offenses in modern Ukraine. Article 358 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code establishes criminal liability for a range of actions related to falsifying official documents, using, or distributing them. The relevance of this article is significant in practice: forged documents often lie at the heart of fraudulent schemes, illegal registration of legal entities, receipt of social benefits, draft evasion, etc. In this article, we will analyze who can be accused under Article 358 of the Criminal Code, its structure, typical cases, court practice, and current law enforcement trends. The Legal Structure of Article 358 Article 358 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine imposes liability for: Forging an identification or other official document issued or certified by an enterprise, institution, or organization.This includes passports, driver’s licenses, medical certificates, birth certificates, and other documents confirming rights or exempting from duties. Creating forged seals, stamps, or formsof enterprises, institutions, or organizations, as well as any other official seals, stamps, or forms for use by others or for sale. Sale or use of a forged document— both the distribution of such fakes and their use to achieve any legal or practical outcome. It’s important to stress that criminal responsibility under this article arises at the age of 16 and only for legally sane individuals. Object and Subject of Crime The object of offenses under Article 358 is: the procedure for circulation of official documents, seals, stamps; legally protected interests of the state, legal entities, and individuals; the rights and freedoms of citizens, which are protected by accurate information in official documents. The subject of the crime is specific documents, forms, seals or stamps created, certified, or issued by authorized persons and carrying legal weight. This also includes forms with approved state-required features. Who Can Be Held Liable: Perpetrator Profile General Provisions A suspect under Article 358 can be any sane physical person, age 16 or older. Notably, this article does not apply to officials who forge documents in the context of their duties — such acts fall under Article 366 of the Code (“Official forgery”). Most Commonly Accused Categories Citizens who forge and use fake documentsto obtain social benefits, evade the draft, cross borders illegally, legalize stay or work abroad. Frequent cases include forged diplomas, driver’s licenses, PCR test results, etc. Fraudsters selling forged documentsvia online platforms, distributing fake seals/stamps for shell companies, laundering funds, or making sham contracts. Private individuals not linked to an office positionwho provide or fabricate forged certificates, extracts, or recommendations — this can involve healthcare workers, job agency personnel, private notaries acting for profit. Organized groups or collaborative schemes:if several individuals jointly (or by prior agreement) produce, send, use, or sell forged documents/seals, their actions may qualify as an organized-group crime (Part 3, Article 358). Penalties are much stricter, usually up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Typical Offense Scenarios Analysis of court practice shows the most common models of offenses under Article 358 are: Obtaining fake certificates, licenses, diplomas via the Internet,for example, for traveling or applying to a consulate. Self-fabrication or insertion of false information into a real document— affixing a photo onto another person’s form, entering incorrect data, erasing or altering records. Entering false information through bribery or collusion with medical, state, or educational institution employees. Making seals or stamps for fictitious contracts or registering false data. Using another person’s signature without their knowledge. Many believe that using a fake reference or certificate, for example for work abroad, is “nothing special”, but even a single use falls under Article 358. Mental Element of the Crime The direct intent is the defining factor: the person knowingly violates the law, wants to achieve a specific result (gain, avoidance of duties, etc.). There is no crime if the person was genuinely unaware of the forgery (e.g. received the document thinking it was real), but proving absence of intent lies with the defense in such cases. Exceptions and Distinctions From Other Articles Official forgery(Article 366) concerns only officials who alter documents as part of their job duties. Certain acts (forgery of banknotes, securities, ID documents) are regulated by specific articles (e.g., Articles 200, 215, 318). Use of fake documents during elections or formal registration is also covered by special laws. Courts repeatedly clarify: simply using a knowingly forged document already constitutes a crime, and users bear liability just as forgers do. Judicial Practice: Real Examples In 2022–2024, the following were most often brought to court: Individuals who bought and used fake vaccination certificates, military medical commission documents, or student IDs; Defendants in fake work record/diploma cases to travel to Poland, Czech Republic and other EU countries; Organizers of networks selling forged seals to set up “one-day” companies; Scammers presenting fake notarial documents for inheritances or real estate transactions. Liability: Sanctions and Real Terms Sanctions under Article 358, depending on circumstances, include: A fine up to 1,000 non-taxable minimum incomes(as of 2025 — UAH 17,000); Arrest for up to 6 months; Restriction of liberty up to 2 years(for repeat/group offenses — up to 5 years of restriction/imprisonment). Penalties increase if the document was used multiple times or by several people together. Practical Advice Carefully check documents’ authenticityeven for everyday or business transactions. Do not use certificates or IDs from dubious sources— a single use can result in criminal liability. Legal entities should organize verification of forms, seals, and signaturesto protect themselves from abuse. Consult a lawyer if forgery is suspected,as proving innocence in court can be complex. Conclusion Anyone — a sane individual age 16 or older — can be charged under Article 358 if they forge or use a fake official document, seal, stamp, or form, regardless of whether for gain or simply to avoid a duty or obtain a benefit. In an era of digitalization and anti-corruption reform, document forgery remains a key threat to legal order. The social danger of this phenomenon explains the need for severe criminal responsibility and extra caution by everyone handling documents. Prepared by: Yevhen Murchenko — Head of

Article 366 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (CCU) is one of the central legal tools against official crimes related to the falsification of official documents. In recent years, this article has been actively applied in judicial practice, especially in high-profile cases involving officials in state administration, finance, and law enforcement. This raises a key question: who can actually be prosecuted under this article? What are the legal and factual grounds for liability? What mistakes are commonly made by both parties during qualification? The answers to these questions lie in a thorough analysis of the law, court practice, and doctrinal approaches. Essence of Article 366 of the CCU Article 366 CCU establishes criminal liability for official forgery—that is, the drafting or issuing by an official of knowingly false official documents, entering knowingly false information in them, or otherwise forging official documents. It is crucial that liability arises for active actions aimed at distorting the truth in official documents. Structurally, the article consists of two parts: Part 1: Covers drafting, issuing, or committing other acts of official forgery, regardless of real consequences. Part 2: Increases liability if the forgery has resulted in serious consequences. Subject of the Crime: Official Document The key element of the crime under Article 366 is an official document. This refers to documents with legal force that create, change, or terminate certain rights or obligations, provide order or procedure. Documents created by private individuals may also be considered official if certified by authorized officials or accepted by state agencies, enterprises, or institutions. The Subject: Who Can Be Held Liable? Article 366 CCU clearly specifies those who may be held criminally liable: officials with managerial, organizational, or administrative powers. These include: Civil servants at all levels; Officials of local self-government bodies; Directors of enterprises, institutions, organizations of any ownership; Officials of state and municipal enterprises; Persons exercising organizational or administrative functions by order, assignment, or other means. If a forgery is committed by an employee who does not formally perform such functions, their actions are qualified under other articles, such as Article 358 (which establishes liability for forgery of documents in general, rather than by officials in their official capacity). Objective Aspect: What Constitutes the Crime? The objective aspect of the crime under Article 366 is: the drafting by an official of a knowingly false official document; the issuing by an official of a knowingly false official document; entering knowingly false data into an official document; other forgery of official documents. Actions must be active, aimed at creating or modifying a document while being aware of its falsehood. Importantly, not entering required data into a document does not constitute this crime and does not incur liability under this article. Further use or dissemination of a forged document is not required for liability to arise. Subjective Aspect: Intent and Guilt Direct intent is crucial: the official must act deliberately, aware that the data entered are false or that the document issued is not genuine. If a person was unaware—even if there was a gross error or negligence—there is no crime under Article 366. Serious Consequences as a Qualifying Feature Part 2 of Article 366 provides liability if the forgery resulted in “serious consequences.” This refers to real material damage at least 250 times the non-taxable minimum income of citizens (approximately 378,500 UAH as of 2024). The damage must arise directly from the actions of the person who committed the forgery. Typical Cases in Court Practice The most common criminal cases under Article 366 CCU include: entering false information in financial, tax, or accounting reports (e.g., an accountant intentionally underreports company income); issuing fake certificates, acts, or contracts for unperformed work; falsifying investigation protocols, court decisions, or other documents within official powers; issuing fake extracts or certificates about property, land, or an individual’s status; signing payment orders or other financial documents with false data for budget transfers. Distinguishing from Other Crimes There is often confusion between Article 366 (official forgery) and Article 358 (forgery in general). The main difference is the presence of a special subject (official) and the connection of actions with the performance of official duties. If the person lacks relevant authority, qualification under Article 366 is not possible. It is also worth mentioning Article 366-1, which deals with knowingly false information in declarations by persons vested with state or local government functions. This article was ruled unconstitutional, but courts sometimes attempt to apply Article 366 as an alternative in similar circumstances. Who Cannot Be Prosecuted under Article 366 CCU? Ordinary employees without managerial or administrative powers; Individuals forging documents “for themselves” or not as part of their job duties or public functions; Persons who acted unintentionally (e.g., by mistake or negligence); Cases where the forgery is unrelated to the performance of official duties but done for private reasons. Typical Errors by the Prosecution and Legal Consequences Frequent mistakes by investigators and prosecutors: Incorrectly defining the status (subject) of the accused; Lack of evidence of intent (direct intention to forge); Qualification of actions as official forgery without connection to official duties; Ignoring the causation between forgery and material harm. These lead to delays, returns of indictments, and acquittals. Defense in Article 366 CCU Cases Effective defense is based on: Proving lack of proper status (official position and authority); Refuting direct intent; Demonstrating no serious consequences (if qualifying under Part 2); Showing the action was not related to official duties. Courts carefully analyze the motives, official duties, and actual functions of the accused. Conclusions Article 366 of the CCU plays a key role in preventing official abuse through the forgery of official documents. Prosecution is possible only if the person: is an official acting in the course of official duties; performs active forgery of documents; acted with direct intent, knowingly; in the case of Part 2: caused serious material harm. Prosecution under this article is not possible for honest errors or actions beyond the scope of official powers. Such cases require detailed investigation of the accused’s position, the nature of their actions, and their intent.